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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONNIE RAE POPE, 
vs. 
DAN L. POPE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
Defendant -Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 15538 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case in which the district court, after a trial on the merits, entered a 
Decree of Divorce, from which the Defendant takes this appeal. Plaintiff-Respondent has 
cross-appealed from the trial court's failure to award alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial herein began on June 9, 1977. In the first session of the trial, the court, by 
minute entry, granted mutual decrees of divorce to the parties, awarded custody of their two 
minor children to the Plaintiff, Connie Rae Pope, and continued the trial to June 14, 1977 
(R.37). On June 14, 1977 the court, after taking testimony, ordered that certain records be 
deli1cn:d to Plaintiff's accountant, and continued the case to June 16, 1977 for a third 
1ession (R.42). On June 16, 1977, the court heard further testimony and again continued the 
n1attcr (r.44). After the lapse of more than one month, the fourth session of the trial was 
held on .July 21, 1977, after which the case was taken under advisement until the following 
< 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
day (R.46). No decision was rendered the following day, but the court filed a Memorandum 
Decision dated August I, 1977 on August 2, 1977 (R.51). Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
then filed specific objections to the Memorandum Decision and to the Findings and 
Conclusions tendered by Plaintiff's counsel (R.55). Counsel for Plaintiff then moved for 
clarification of the Memorandum Decision with respect to certain matters in issue with 
which the Memorandum Decision did not deal (R.61). In an apparent attempt to resolve all 
matters which had been raised by counsel after the court's Memorandum Decision, a fifth 
session was held on October 3, 1977, when a minute entry order was made and the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were finally filed (R. 73, 74, 79). 
Defendant-Appellant moved for a new trial on October 12, 1977 (R.84), and the motion was 
denied both by Memorandum Decision filed October 31, I 977 (R.99) and by formal Order 
filed November II, 1977 (R.J03). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant here seeks reversal of the district court's Decree and remand 
of the case for a new trial or for the entry of Findings, Conclusions and a Decree which 
fairly, justly and equitably adjudicate the property rights of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on September 16, 1968 and have two children, born 
September 22, 1969 and November II, 1972 (T.22). In the eight years following their 
marriage, the parties acquired real and personal property having substantial value. In June 
of 1977 when the trial in this case began, the parties' assets were as follows: 
I. A combination permanent mobile home park - temporary trailer and 
camper park - campground known as the Western Park Campground, located 
in the City of Logan, Utah. The district court found the value of this property 
to be $154,500.00 (R.51). 
2. A mobile home sales facility known as Four Seasons Mobile Home Sales, 
also located in Logan, Utah. It was stipulated that this property had a value of 
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$39,500.00 (T.46). 
3. A trailer park-campground located near Bear Lake in Garden City, Rich 
County, Utah. The value of this property was stipulated to be $25,500.00 (T.46). 
4. A residence in the city of Logan, Utah. Although the value of this property 
was sharply in dispute (T.50,84), the court below fixed its value at $46,500.00 
(R.51). 
5. Four mobile homes located in Smithfield, Utah, and used by the parties as 
rental properties. The value of these properties was also disputed; the district court 
fixed their value at $10,000.00 (R.52). 
6. Equipment, trade fixtures and inventory connected with the Western 
Park Campground facility (no. I, above); the court below fixed the value of this 
property at $2500.00 (R.52). 
7. Equipment, trade fixtures and inventory connected with the Four Seasons 
Mobile Home Sales property (no. 2, above). In the court's Memorandum Decision, 
this property was valued at $9, 728.00. 
8. Household furniture and furnishings which the district court valued at 
$2500.00 (R.52). 
9. Corporate stock in a business known as Crystal Hot Springs. This stock was 
purchased for $7500.00 (T.285), and the court below appears to have valued 
it at that figure (R.52). 
10. A 1973 Chevrolet Corvette automobile which the district court erroneously 
believed was listed in the income tax depreciation schedule as inventory of 
Four Seasons Mobile Home Sales (R.52) (no. 7, above). Defendant-Appellant 
testified that he had paid $6,000.00 for this automobile in October of 1976(T.14!, 
414). Because the district judge erroneously included this car in the inventory 
of one of the businesses, he did not fix its value. The only evidence in the record as 
to the value of this automobile is Defendant's Exhibit 23, where the car is valued 
$5,000.00. 
II. A Toyota automobile purchased by Plaintiff-Respondent after the parties' 
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separation (T.283). The district court made no mention of this automobile in its 
Memorandum Decision (R.51) and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree (R.74) also fail to take this vehicle into account. There was no testimony 
as to the value of this car except that Plaintiff-Respondent owed $1,500.00 
on it (T.283) and the value of$! ,000.00 shown in Defendant's Exhibit 23. 
12. A Jaguar automobile (R.!OO), the value of which appears to have been set 
by the court at $400.00 (T.451), although the only evidence in the record as to 
the value of this vehicle is Defendant's Exhibit 23, stating that it was worth 
$500.00. 
13. A Suzuki motorcycle which the lower court valued at $400.00 (R.52). 
The parties' debts at the time of trial consisted of the following: 
I. A total of $239,353.00 as listed in Defendant's Exhibit 23 (T.383). 
2. The following additional debts: 
A. The sum of $!,500.00 owed on the Toyota automobile (T.283). 
B. The sum of $499.00 owed for a refrigerator purchased by Plaintiff-
Respondent (T.338). 
C. A Sears charge account balance of $500.00 (T.302). 
D. A Montgomery-Ward charge account balance of $180.00 (T.303). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF PROPERTY WAS BASED UPON A SERIES OF 
ERRORS AND OMMISSIONS THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It would appear from the trial court's Memorandum Decision (R.54) and from 
subsequent proceedings below (T.45!) that the trial judge decided to divide the parties' 
property equally, awarding to each one-half of that which they had acquired through their 
joint effort during the marriage. However, the court erred seriously in arriving at its attempt 
to divide the property. These errors include the following: 
I. Valuation of the equipment, trade fixtures and inventory of Four Seasons Mobile 
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Home Sales. The district judge relied entirely upon the depreciation schedule of the parties' 
1976 federal income tax return (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7) to determine both the composition and 
value of this property (R.52). The depreciation schedule, however, lists two items of 
"transportation equipment" which were clearly established by the testimony to have been 
sold prior to the trial. The first of these items was a Buick automobile which was sold in 
April of 1977 (T.I42; Plaintiff's Exhibit 9); the other was a one-half interest in an airplane 
which was sold in November of 1976 (T.7, 147, 416; Defendant's Exhibit 1). The lower 
court further erred in fixing the value of this property in its assumption (R.52) that the 
Corvette automobile was included somewhere on the depreciation schedule (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7), which it plainly is not. 
2. Valuation of the parties' equity in the trailer park-campground at Garden 
City, Utah. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court fixed the parties' equity in this 
property at $17,273.00 (R.51). The court seems to have arrived at this figure by subtracting 
the stipulated unpaid mortgage balance of $7,226.71 (T .164) from the stipulated value of 
$25,500.00 (T.45), leaving an "equity" of $18,273.00; the court below obviously made an 
error of $1,000.00 in making this subtraction. Of greater importance, however, is the lower 
court's failure to take into consideration the undisputed testimony of Defendant-Appellant 
(T.356) that this land at Bear Lake was owned jointly with his brother and sister, and that 
he had agreed with them that, in exchange for their conveyance of their interest to him, he 
owed each of them one-third the value of the land. Trial counsel attempted to rectify the 
court's failure to consider the interests of the brother and sister, first by objecting (R.57) to 
the Memorandum Decision and thereafter by motion for a new trial (R.84) supported by the 
affidavits of Defendant-Appellant (R.86), the brother (R.91) and the sister (R.92). The 
motion was summarily denied with no reason given (R.99, 103). 
3. Valuation of the parties' total "equity" in all properties. The trial judge found that 
the parties' net "equity" in all properties was $88,187.00, and ruled that each party was 
entitled to one-half this sum or $44,093.00 (R.53). After awarding to Plaintiff-Respondent 
the home and household furnishings, the court subtracted the "equity" value of this 
property (amounting to $16,609.00 for the home and $2500.00 for the furnishings) from 
5 
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one-half the total "equity", and ruled that Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to the 
difference, or a lump sum cash award of $24,984.00 (R.82). In arriving at this figure, the 
trial judge made the errors that have been discussed in the two immediately preceding 
paragraphs. The court also made the following errors, all of which are completely contrary 
to the evidence: 
A. Omission of Assets: The court below, in computing the parties' net 
"equity" in their property taken as a collective whole, failed to include assets 
which the evidence clearly proved existed. These assets include the Jaguar 
automobile (R.IOO), the Toyota automobile (T.283), the Corvette automobile 
(t.141) and the stock In Crystal Hot Springs (T.285). 
B. Inclusion of Non-Existent Assets: As discussed above, the trial judge 
included a Buick automobile and a one-half interest in an airplane, both of which 
assets had been sold prior to the trial (T.7, 142, 147, 416; Plaintiff's Exhibits 
7 and 9). 
C. Ommission of Debts: The trial court completely ignored undisputed 
evidence in the record which established the existence of several debts owed by 
the parties: 
I. The loan on Plaintiff-Respondent's automobile in the amount of 
$1,500.00 (T.283). 
2. The debt owed to Defendant-Appellant's brother and sister on the Bear 
Lake property, amounting to $9,333.00 (T.356.413, R. 86, 91, 92). 
3. Security deposits of $2,420.00 which had been collected by the parties 
from tenants of the various rental properties (Defendant's Exhibit 23; 
T. 383, 409). 
4. Sales tax of $482.00 collected but not yet remitted to the State of Utah 
(Defendant's Exhibit 23, T.383, 410). 
5. Debt arising from the operation of Western Park Campground, amount-
in! at the time of trial to $1,501.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.393, 410). 
6. Debt arising from the operation of Four Seasons Mobile Home Sales in 
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the sum of $7,371.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.393, 411). 
7. A student loan of $597.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.393, 412). 
8. A loan secured by the Corvette automobile in the amount of $4,304.00 
(Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.383, 414). 
9. A loan of $6,081.00 for operating expenses of Four Seasons Mobile 
Homes (Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.383, 415). 
10. A shortage of $4,152.00 on the floor planning payments owed by Four 
Seasons Mobile Homes (Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.383, 416). 
II. Interest payment of $645.00 owed on the Four Seasons floor planning 
(Defendant's Exhibit 23; T.383). 
12. Property taxes of $976.00 owed by the businesses (Defendant's Exhibit 
23; T.383). 
Although the court attempted to place "equity" values on the various businesses, 
it is clear from the above that these debts, omitted in the court's computations of the 
"equity" values, are, except for numbers and 7, additional debts against the various 
businesses, and must be considered. 
It is fundamental to the approach taken by the trial judge, i.e., a determination of 
the "equity" the parties have acquired in their various properties, that such "equity" 
cannot exceed the difference between the total value of the parties' assets and their total 
liabilities. By omitting certain assets which existed, by including certain assets which had 
been sold long before trial, and by omitting debts totalling $39,362.00 (numbers 1 through 
12 supra), from its computations, the court acted contrary to uncontradicted testimony and 
so arbitrarily that the result it reached is pervaded by error and omission. 
The law in Utah is settled that where, as here, the trial court's decision is not supported 
by any evidence whatever, or is not supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence, this 
Court has the power to correct obvious errors made in the disposition of property. Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 Pac. 214 (1930); Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 Pac. 647 
(1919). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF PROPERTY AND ITS ORDERS REGARDING 
THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS WORK SUCH A SEVERE INEQUITY AS TO MANI-
FEST CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In the decree of divorce (R. 79) and in a subsequent order (R.1 00), the trial court award-
ed various properties to each party and ordered each party to pay certain obligations. 
Following is a summary of the distribution made: 
PROPERTY AWARDED 
Home 
Furniture 
Jaguar 
Stock 
Toyota 1 
Cash 
TOTAL 
PROPERTY AWARDED 
Bear Lake Facility 
Western Park Campground 
Four Seasons Mobile Home Sales 
Mobile home-rental units 
Suzuki motorcycle 
Corvette automobile 
Four Seasons inventory 
Western Park inventory 
Cash 2 
CONNIE RAE POPE 
VALUE 
$46,500 
2,500 
400 
7,500 
1,000 
24,984 
$82,884 
DAN L. POPE 
VALUE 
$ 25,500 
154,500 
39,500 
10,000 
400 
5,000 
9,278 
2,500 
7,500 
TOTAL $254, 178 
DEBTS ORDERED PAID 
Home $29,891 
-0-
-0-
-0-
Automobile 1,500 
Montgomery-Ward 180 
Refrigerator 499 
---
TOTAL $32,070 
DEBTS ORDERED PAID 
I. 
2. 
3. 
All debts incurred 
during marriage (except 
home mortgage) ... 
$209,462 3 ' 
Sears, Roebuck 500 
Cash to Plaintiff 
24,984 
TOTAL $234,946 
These tables illustrate the effect of the trial court's errors and ommissions; 
Plaintiff-Respondent's net worth (assets minus liabilities) after the decree is $50,814.00, 
whereas that of Defendant-Appellant is $19,232, even assuming that the $7,500.00 cash 
1 No mention is made of this vehicle in the Decree or later orders; however. Defendant-Appellant ha'> a~~ened no mtere'>t m th1~ vehicle 
so it is here considered to have been awarded to Plaintiff-Respondent 
2 The district court, in its Memorandum Decision, "a-...arded" thJ'> to Defendant-Appellant, although there 1~ no te\tJmon~ thatthi· 
fund existed at the time of trial. 
3 Summanzed in Defendant's Exhibit 23. 
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which the court "awarded" to him existed (see note 2). This result is the very sort of 
manifest injustice to which this court has referred in prior decisions, and because the 
decision was founded in large part upon the errors and omissions discussed above, the 
division is, indeed, plainly arbitrary. In such cases, this Court must correct the trial court's 
abuse of its discretion. Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939 (1958); Pfaff v. Pfaff, 
121 Utah 277, 241 P.2d 156 (1952); Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872 (1946); 
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P .2d 252 (1943). 
The inequity which results from the lower court's decision is even more apparent in 
view of the fact that Defendant-Appellant will be forced to liquidate one or more of his 
businesses in order to obtain the cash award he has been ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff-Respondent (R.90). It seems clear that to force Defendant-Appellant to sell his 
business is completely contradictory to the principle that the court's responsibility is to 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of the parties' economic resources so 
that they may reconstruct their lives on a useful basis. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 
P.2d 977 (1956). 
POINT III 
THE AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE PLEADINGS AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiff-Respondent the sum of $1,500.00 attorney's fees and 
$30.00 costs. These awards cannot be upheld by this Court because the pleadings in the 
record do not support them. The complaint filed on Plaintiff-Respondent's behalf by her 
first attorney in this matter alleges that Plaintiff should be awarded a reasonable attorney's 
fee, and it specifically states that " ... a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter is 
$1,000.00" (R.2). Moreover, the complaint neither alleges nor prays for costs, and there is 
no prayer for general relief. It is fundamental law that a judgment must be consistent with 
and limited to that sought by the pleadings. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 49. It is submitted that 
the judgment for attorney's fees herein is limited by the complaint to the sum of $1 ,000.00, 
and that the award of $30.00 costs is not supported by any pleading whatsoever. 
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Accordingly, the judgment for attorney's fees should be reduced by remittitur to $1,000.00, 
and the judgment for costs should be eliminated entirely. The rule is concisely stated in 
Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 Pac. 913 (I 930): " ... it would be improper in any case 
to award a judgment for what is not demanded." 292 Pac. at 914. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF TEN PERCENT INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS EXCESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
A judgment in the sum of $24,984.00 was awarded to Plaintiff-Respondent, and the 
trial court ordered that this judgment bear interest after six months at the rate of ten percent 
(IOO?o) per year (R.82). The lower court may have had discretion to award this rate of 
interest, which is higher than the statutory rate of eight percent (80Jo) on judgments, if there 
had been some evidence in the record to support a finding that such an increase over the 
statutory rate was reasonable. However, there is nothing in the evidence to support such a 
finding; indeed, no such finding was made (R.74). Accordingly, the judgment should bear 
interest at the statutory maximum of eight percent (80Jo). The statutory language is man-
datory: " ... judgments shall bear interest at the rate of eight percent." § 15-1-4, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). See also Rule 54( e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court rests upon many errors and omissions, and is 
manifestly unfair to Defendant-Appellant. If the Decree remain in force, he will be forced 
to sell one or more of the business enterprises which serve as the basis for his livelihood and 
the source of support for the parties and their children. The decision of the lower court 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, or with directions to enter 
findings and a decree consistent with such modifications as this Court may determine are 
necessary to effect a just and equitable division of the parties' property and debts. 
Respectfully submitted this _day of March, 1978. 
JAY D. EDMONDS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
10 Exchange Place, Suite #309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
10 
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